The authors consider how uncertainty over protest occurrence shapes the strategic interaction between companies and activists. Analyzing Wal-Mart, the authors find support for their theory that companies respond to this uncertainty through a "test for protest" approach. In Wal-Mart's case, this consists of low-cost probes in the form of new store proposals. They then withdraw if they face protests, especially when those protests signal future problems. WalMart is more likely to open stores that are particularly profitable, even if they are protested. This uncertainty-based account stands in sharp contrast to full-information models that characterize protests as rare miscalculations.
This question is not just of interest to scholars of retailing or regional studies, but of central importance to students of social movements and economic sociologists. Although a fast-growing body of work studies the sequencing of protests (e.g., Minkoff 1997 ) and movement-countermovement dynamics (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996) , there has been much less attention devoted to the behavior of the targets of protest. Perhaps, with the exception of McAdam (1983) , protest targets have largely been depicted as actors devoid of strategic ability and, instead, either blind to protests or able to crudely repress activists using the levers of the state. By contrast, the bulk of the literature treats activists as strategic actors confronting inert targets. Many of these studies analyze how movements arise against state apparatuses and have not devoted as much attention to protests directed against nonstate organizations (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008; Walker, Martin, and McCarthy 2008) , and work on the effects of protests on corporate decisions (Luders 2006; King and Soule 2007; King 2008b; Weber, Rao, and Thomas 2009 ) has typically not examined strategic competition between targets and activists. Formal models by political scientists that presume that both parties have complete information suggest that, in equilibrium, protest is a rare miscalculation because both activists and targets have incentives to avoid the cost of a protest (see Baron and Diermier 2007) . Yet between 1998 and 2005, 35% of Wal-Mart's new store proposals were met with a protest. This statistic casts doubt on the argument that protests are likely to be rare miscalculations. When a proposal was met with protest, the rate of subsequent openings was only 35%. These statistics cast doubt on claims that activists choose easy targets that accede before a protest and that firms successfully thwart targeting by developing a tough reputation. The substantial variance in the incidence and success of protests against Wal-Mart redirects attention to our basic questions: Why does an organization as capable and powerful as Wal-Mart allow itself to so often become a protest target? And why does it succumb to many of these protests?
Answering these questions in a theoretically informed way requires that we also examine the unique characteristics of protests that target private business firms such as Wal-Mart. To begin with, the business firms targeted by activists have capabilities and goals different from those of states. Wal-Mart, arguably, is more coherent and focused in pursuit of its expansion goals relative to public bureaucracies that may frequently reflect goal disagreement due to the tension between their bureaucratic structures and goals derived from the democratic will of the community and due to the relative complexity of their goals (Blau and Scott 1962) . Also critical, protests against Wal-Mart are local in nature and more likely to be led by local activists.
We build on these ideas and suggest that Wal-Mart and activists spear-heading protests face uncertainty, and this uncertainty is at the crux of their interaction. Activists ideologically opposed to big-box stores or those driven by not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY) motivations face uncertainty about where Wal-Mart will open a store and whether it can overcome the barriers to collective action in a community. Wal-Mart is uncertain about whether protests will mobilize in a community, whether they are driven by ideological or NIMBY considerations, and whether the protesters will seek to use public institutions to block an opening or to raise costs considerably. We suggest that Wal-Mart uses a "test for protest" approach using lowcost probes that take the form of a proposal. We argue that for Wal-Mart the cost of filing a proposal is low. We also suggest that the cost of dropping a proposal after a protest is low. As a result, it becomes possible for WalMart to resolve uncertainty about the costs of entry into a community by testing the waters in many communities by filing proposals. For potential activists, the proposal is the stimulus that may trigger organizing activity. Since protests are a costly form of collective action, they constitute signals. Protests signal to Wal-Mart that costs of obtaining regulatory approval in a community are likely to be high and that the reception of the store by shoppers will be less positive. Protests also signal to other passive citizens in the community who share common cause with activists that they are not alone and that a voice is possible.
When protests signal that the costs of entry are likely to be high, WalMart is likely to drop the proposal and try elsewhere. When do protests signal that the costs of entry are likely to be high? When they are led by local organizations, when there are successful protests in nearby communities, when nearby communities have imposed tough regulations, or when they occur in communities with liberal ideologies. Wal-Mart also considers the likely profitability of a store and is more likely to persist in opening it in the face of protest when the proposed store is farther away from an existing store. Wal-Mart's approach is consistent with its preference that protests be local and not coalesce into a regional or national movement. When Wal-Mart opens a store in the face of protest, it also is likely to make greater donations to the community than it otherwise would have in a bid to repair its identity.
A central implication of our reasoning is that protests are sources of information to decision makers and help shape markets. Traditionally, protests have been treated as mechanisms of policy implementation (Andrews 2001) , methods of gaining concessions from business firms (Luders 2006) , delegitimizing administrators (Rojas 2006) , or mechanisms of agenda setting in political life (King 2008a) . Our study suggests that protests transmit signals about domain consensus for organizational executives. Since Thompson (1967, p. 29) , a canonical proposition in organi-zational theory is that exchange agreements rest on prior consensus regarding the domain of an organization-a set of expectations about what the organization will and will not do. Protests signal ideological opposition and, by implication, foretell the costs of entry and future profitability of operations and enable executives to make decisions about where to locate operations. In this sense, market building is a political activity (Fligstein 2001) , and the spatial organization of protests shapes the economic geography of business enterprises.
The fundamental conditions on which we rest our explanation of the incidence and success of Wal-Mart protests is that the company is uncertain as to when its actions will be met with protests and that it has the capacity to test for protest with low-cost proposals. These conditions appear to occur in many other circumstances, for example, when companies make proposals for disposing of toxic waste, consider opening or closing an operation, introduce or discontinue a product or service, or change policies of corporate governance or employment relations. We therefore believe that our test for protest theory is applicable broadly to explain the strategic interaction of companies and potential activists. That said, the context in which we develop this theory, protests against WalMart stores, is itself significant, and we now turn to that phenomenon.
WAL-MART'S CONTENTIOUS GROWTH
Wal-Mart is not only the biggest retailer in the world but also the largest firm in the world, measured by employment. It operates more than 7,800 stores, and its 2009 revenue of $401 billion worldwide is greater than the world's second-, third-, and fourth-largest retailers combined. It employs more than 1.4 million workers in the United States and is the largest employer. It has international operations spread over many countries, and international revenue accounts for 24.5% of its total. Its origins can be traced back to 1962, when the Walton brothers began opening discount stores in towns with populations of 5,000-25,000 and sought to draw customers from a large radius offering a wide variety of name-brand goods at discounted prices, while spending very little on advertising and marketing. Wal-Mart was the fastest retailer to reach the $1 billion revenue milestone, which it achieved in 1979. Subsequently it began to open supercenters, stores with 150,000-250,000 square feet of space that had a grocery section and offered an even wider array of products.
By 1988, Wal-Mart was included in the Dow Jones Industrial Index and exceeded $100 billion in revenues. In that year it had 341 supercenters and started to create neighborhood markets, 40,000-square-foot grocery markets to penetrate into small towns that could not sustain supercenters.
By 2009 Wal-Mart had 2,612 supercenters with an average footprint of 187,000 square feet, each with 50 or so departments including a grocery store.
Research shows that Wal-Mart stores have mixed effects on the communities in which they are located. In general, retail employment declines as a result of Wal-Mart entry (Basker 2005a; Dube, Eidlin, and Lester 2005) , but consumers benefit from 3% overall price declines in competing stores; in the case of some items, the declines are as high as 13% (Basker 2005b; Hausman and Leibtag 2005) . Wal-Mart has negative effects on local retailers (Irwin and Clark 2006) , and supercenters undermine grocery stores and other retailers. In view of their mixed impact on the local retail trade and the increase in congestion and traffic, Wal-Mart faces uncertainty as to whether local activists will organize protests and raise its costs of entry or even deter entry.
Uncertainty about Protest
While Wal-Mart may be knowledgeable about the nature of consumer demand and the needs of its target consumers, it is uncertain about whether activists will mobilize protests and use public institutions such as local government bodies to block entry or to raise the costs and decrease the benefits of entry by imposing requirements and undermining the legitimacy of the store in question. Wal-Mart's uncertainty arises from location-specific factors such as the costs of organizing and mobilizing for collective action and whether there is a local political entrepreneur (which could be an individual or an organization) who can carry a protest to the city council, licensing bureau, or environmental regulation office.
Wal-Mart's difficulty in predicting protests derives partly from an uncertainty faced by potential activists, specifically, whether efforts to organize and protests will be successful. For activists, protest may be seen as a discrete multiplayer public-goods game. Models of discrete public goods typically have two equilibria: one in which there are few or no contributors and no public good, and another in which there is broad contribution and success in creating the public good. Insight into the tipping point between these two equilibria comes from the literature on critical mass models of collective action, which holds that individuals vary in their willingness to participate in collective action. Further, that willingness increases the more others participate in collective action because of social rewards and because the individual risks of protest are lower when the protesting group is larger. Successful collective action, therefore, depends on a sufficiently large mass of individuals willing to be first movers (Granovetter 1978; Oliver and Marwell 1988) . Incomplete information enters the process because the willingness to be a first mover depends on perceptions of others' willingness to act. King (2008b) gives a cogent account of the uncertainty and barriers faced by those who might protest Wal-Mart:
Members of a community may want to keep large retail corporations from setting up shop in their community. . . . Yet if individuals do not share a common view of the problem or are not aware that other members of their community oppose large retailers, oppositional action will not likely occur. Small business owners and other members of the community may also lack the time to start a campaign against the large retailer. . . . They may fear that individual resistance to the problem may not impede the retailer. Furthermore, they may think that even if they were to form a constituent group publicly opposed to large retailers, their chances of success are very small. They are not familiar with past collective successes of this type and may not be aware of the policies or legal changes needed to preserve their small business environment. (King 2008b, p. 26) Comments from citizen-protestors also support the uncertainty at the heart of our model. After protestors induced a Wal-Mart withdrawal in Newport News, Virginia, in 2005, they appeared to have been highly doubtful about success: "I can't believe we won," one resident told the press (Sprawl-Busters 2005). Another said upon learning of the victory, "you're kidding. I have chills going down my back. Everyone told me you can't fight city hall, but I said you have to fight even if you don't win." A third summarized, "I'm stunned. I'm really stunned." Clearly, these are nothing like the prescient agents that drive full-information models of protest. Diermeier and Van Mieghem (2008) offer a formal model of collective action in which participation rates are high or low depending on the size of the collective benefit b, the costs of participation for each participant c, and the number of participants necessary for successful collective action k, and collective action occurs whether . At the heart of our approach b 1 kc to the phenomenon of anti-Wal-Mart protests is a belief that Wal-Mart cannot accurately evaluate whether for specific store proposals. We b 1 kc have explained the theoretical justification for this belief, that the resolution of depends on the perceptions of hundreds of potential prob 1 kc testors. Nevertheless, it is worth examining the empirical evidence for this position. Can Wal-Mart use the characteristics of communities to accurately predict where protests are likely to occur? Our analysis indicates that it cannot.
Appendix tables A1 and A2 show the results of an analysis in which the dependent variable is whether or not a proposed Wal-Mart store meets protest. This model is an intermediate stage in our analysis of the likelihood of protest success, but for now it is relevant in two ways. First, some community characteristics increase or decrease the likelihood of a protest. The significant variables are fully consistent with past analyses of social movement activity and fit into the above model. Liberal ideology (operationalized in the model by Democratic Party voters and collegeeducated citizens) would represent a larger b and does indeed increase the likelihood of a protest. Social movement theorists would predict that the costs of organizing, c, are lower for homogeneous communities and those with preexisting social movement organizations. Again, communities with those characteristics are more likely to host protests against WalMart.
The second key result of the modeling effort concerns the overall predictive power of the model and is revealed in table A2. Simply, the model is not very good at accurately identifying where protests will occur. The model accurately predicts whether a community will be in the protest or no-protest category 70% of the time when we set the predictive criterion at 0.5. This is only a small improvement on the null model (since 65% of Wal-Mart proposals met no protest, a null model that simply predicted "no protest" in every instance would be right 65% of the time). Another way to consider the accuracy of the model is that it correctly predicts protests only about one-third of the time ( ), and these relatively 192/563 few successes come at the cost of misclassifying approximately 10% of the cases that did not experience protests. The meager predictive power is not a result of the parsimony of the model presented; we have examined dozens of variables in efforts to build a more accurate model of the incidence of protest. In analyses not reported for the sake of brevity, we constructed yearly models of protests for each year from 1998 until 2005. We found that the ability of the model to correctly predict protests did not appreciably improve over time, so there is no reason to believe that Wal-Mart's uncertainty decreased over time.
We take from these analyses and the complementary theory regarding the difficulty of predicting collective action that Wal-Mart is uncertain as to where and when protests will happen. This uncertainty is at the foundation of the theory and predictions we develop next. In brief, we expect that Wal-Mart will take an exploratory approach, launching many new store proposals in a low-cost way, as an attempt to test communities for their capacity to protest. Protests will be taken as signals about the costs and benefits of a new store, and Wal-Mart will often withdraw when protested. When Wal-Mart does not withdraw (perhaps because a store is particularly beneficial or because the protest signal is weak), it will manage the store opening so as to limit the spillover of contention to other locales.
Exploratory Expansion in the Face of Uncertain Contention
In one sense, as a multilocation firm thinking of new locations, Wal-Mart's situation is analogous to a multiproduct firm that faces uncertainty about whether new products are likely to succeed and gain market share. In such cases, as Raubitschek (1988) points out, firms have incentives to proliferate products to "hit the jackpot," and such an approach is viable when the cost of trial is low and when the cost of exit is low. For example, in Japan, 1,000 new soft drinks are launched each year, and only three of them become hits. Failed drinks are withdrawn in a matter of weeks. Coke Japan launches 100 soft drinks each year in the hope that one of them will be a hit. Similarly, Wal-Mart is a multilocation firm and faces uncertainty about collective action that can raise costs of entry in a location and has to test the waters in many communities. So it tests for protests through low-cost probes that take the form of proposals.
The costs of testing a market by filing a store proposal are low. WalMart does not need to buy land in advance or commit to expenses. It needs to prepare a proposal that contains a noise study, a traffic study, an air study, an environmental impact study, and an economic impact study. Often, these costs may be shared by a developer. For example, a noise study costs between $5,000 and $10,000, and the other studies are comparable. Thus, the cost of a proposal is around $150,000, with liberal allowances for each of these studies. Municipal planning departments charge modest sums ranging from $2,000 to $10,000 to evaluate proposals. Proposals are essential for activists to begin organizing because there needs to be a target and threat for protests to arise. Note that the cost of withdrawal is low too for Wal-Mart because many of these proposals are in small towns and receive local news coverage rather than national coverage. Testing the water in many communities is a simple way for WalMart to avoid making mistakes because it is far cheaper than making an actual investment in land and buildings to open a store against community opposition. As one Wal-Mart official said, "When we are looking at investing more than $10 million in a community, we don't want to make any mistakes" (Sprawl-Busters 1998).
When Wal-Mart tests the waters in a community by placing a proposal, it receives a signal in the form of a protest. Signals are credible when they are partially under the control of the sender and when they are costly enough (Spence 1973) . Protests are costly to organize and are partially under the control of activists, and therefore, they signal to Wal-Mart that the entry may be blocked or the costs of entry may be too high because of ideological opposition or NIMBY concerns. Protests signal to passive members in the community that they are not alone and that voice and action are possible and, thereby, may trigger further participation. While it is conceivable that protests against Wal-Mart may trigger countermobilizing by Wal-Mart supporters, they face high barriers to mobilization, at the least the typical ones of free-riding and absence of organization, plus the stigma of an unfashionable cause, and are unlikely to band together.
A fundamental implication of the argument that Wal-Mart tests markets by floating proposals is that it is uncertain whether it will be welcomed by a community and whether it will incur protests. This is in sharp contrast to models from positive nonmarket strategy, which presume full information on behalf of targets and protesters (see Baron and Diermeier 2007) . Under full information, protests are an anomaly. If potential protestors have the capacity to win a contention, then the corporate target should concede before the protest starts; if the corporation has the power to win, then protestors should not bother with costly protests. Protests, therefore, would occur only if one party miscalculates its odds of winning. As we have reported, 35% of Wal-Mart's proposals from 1998 to 2005 were protested, a figure that should baffle anyone who believes that WalMart knows before proposing a store whether the target community will generate a sufficiently potent protest. In the next part of our theory development, we consider Wal-Mart's response when protests occur.
Response to Protest
A second fundamental implication of the test for protest theory is that Wal-Mart will often not open a proposed store if it is protested. There are serious reasons to credit the null hypothesis in this case, again by referencing the full-information theory. If, as that theory suggests, protests occur when a party to a potential contention miscalculates its odds of winning, it is reasonable to argue that it would be the protestors, decentralized and motivated partially by ideological concerns, that would make the mistake of tilting at windmills.
Further arguments from game theory suggest that Wal-Mart might fight any protest vigorously so as to avoid developing a reputation as a "weak target" and attracting more protests (Baron 2009 ). If that were true, the resources of the world's largest corporation could presumably overwhelm any of the local groups that protest Wal-Mart. Instead, we believe that the social movement context shifts Wal-Mart's reputational concerns. A reputation for bullying communities could be even more harmful for the company than a reputation as a weak target. By withdrawing in the face of protests rather than fighting them out, Wal-Mart reduces the likelihood of protest contagion. A bitter and public fight with one community could make Wal-Mart a common enemy that a regional or national social movement could cohere around (Klandermans 2002) . Furthermore, quick with-drawals may not feed a reputation that Wal-Mart is a weak target if they are not widely communicated in the press (King 2008a) . In line with this, reports of Wal-Mart withdrawals in the national press were vanishingly rare (a total of 13 reports, representing roughly 2% of Wal-Mart withdrawals).
Local reports of Wal-Mart withdrawals were also infrequent, but those we found provided support for our argument that Wal-Mart interpreted protests as negative indicators in the testing of a proposed store. In Edmond, Oklahoma, in 1998, when a supercenter proposal was met with a protest, a Wal-Mart representative at a public hearing explained that his company did not anticipate such emotional opposition to the store (Sprawl-Busters 1998). In 2000, when Wal-Mart backed off a proposal in Fort Worth, Texas, a representative actually expressed gratitude to signatories of an anti-Wal-Mart petition: "Certainly our actions show that we are willing to respond to feedback. We appreciate the individuals that provide us with good solid information that we can work with" (SprawlBusters 2000).
Hypothesis 1.
-Proposed Wal-Mart stores are less likely to open when they are protested.
Of course, Wal-Mart does not concede to every protest. In the next subsection we consider how the costs, illuminated by the signal of the protest, of opening a store are balanced against the benefits.
Costs Signaled by Protests
Protest organizations as a signal.-A powerful signal for Wal-Mart that a protest will exert substantial costs of opening is the existence of a special-purpose organization championing the cause of the protesters. Such organizations are very useful tools for mobilizing the diffuse interests of the anti-Wal-Mart contenders. Since "the mobilization potential of a group is largely determined by the degree of preexisting group organization" (Jenkins 1983, p. 538) , social movements are more likely to have an impact when community-level organizational infrastructures are available to supply activists. Many configurations, including personal networks, voluntary associations, work groups, and other existing organizations and institutions, have been shown to enable individuals to act collectively (Marrett 1980; McAdam 1988; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1988; McCarthy and Wolfson 1988; Gould 1991; Oliver 1993) . These infrastructures provide knowledge capital that helps the new movement develop organizationally and achieve its goals (Cress and Snow 1996) and supply trained organization builders (Swaminathan and Wade 2001) .
In addition, equipped movement organizations may provide an apparatus to encourage and direct protests. Organizations also maintain interorganizational relations that act as a communication network for a social movement that might otherwise suffer from isolation as it is exercised at the local level. This can be useful to communicate ideas about protest tactics between places and increases the risk to Wal-Mart that a fierce battle may ignite protests in other places.
Hypothesis 2.
-Proposed Wal-Mart stores are less likely to open when protests are led by organizations.
Spatial contagion as a signal.-Spatial contagion is of particular significance for movements against geographically dispersed organizations such as Wal-Mart. Identity movements are certainly capable of spreading their messages over geographic distance through the work of mobile activists and media sources (Roscigno and Danaher 2001) . Because the majority of an individual's ties reach over short distances, personal networks are best at spreading social movements across relatively small, often spatially contiguous, areas. Spatial contagion has been observed for social movement activity such as rioting (Myers 1997 (Myers , 2000 , strikes (Conell and Cohn 1995) , and armed resistance (Gould 1995; Oliver and Myers 2003) . Most important for our study, social movement organizing activity has been shown to spread through spatial contagion (Hedstrom 1994; Hedstrom, Sandell, and Stern 2000) . The fundamental process underlying such spatial contagion is information transmission; that is, the message and actions of the social movement must become known so that they can spread. Rioting, for example, spreads because it is reported in the news, and it spreads through spatially heterogeneous contagion because local news is reported in more detail than national news (Myers 1997) . Similarly, trade unions spread because their organizers seek to use social contacts to start unions in other locales, and they spread through spatially heterogeneous contagion because social contacts are denser over short distances (Hedstrom 1994) .
If protest is limited to one community, Wal-Mart may circumvent it by opening a store in a neighboring community. Just as an oilman may drain the oil from underneath neighboring properties with a deep well, WalMart may drain retail business from a community by locating in a neighboring community. A successful protest in a neighboring area is likely to have a powerful impetus for protest because activists can learn tactics from neighboring areas (Olzak, Shanahan, and West 1994; Soule 1997; Oliver and Myers 2003) . In turn, successful protests in the neighboring area also bolster the identity mobilization effort in a focal community against Wal-Mart. Anti-Wal-Mart protestors realize this, giving them yet more motivation to operate spatially. Wal-Mart also has incentives for protests to be local and not coalesce into a broad movement at the state level or national level. One way of undercutting such contagion is to drop a protested proposal in a community when protests in neighboring communities have been successful.
Hypothesis 3 Institutional escalation as a signal.-Wal-Mart's contagion concerns are not merely that protest will spread, but that specific regulatory responses against new big-box stores will spread from municipality to municipality. The "nuclear option" of regulatory responses against Wal-Mart is a size-cap restriction, which limits retail stores in the municipality to a given size chosen to preclude big-box retailers. If protestors succeed in encouraging size-cap regulation, it is particularly bad for Wal-Mart because it eliminates the whole of the municipality as a potential location for as long as the restriction stands. Given the evidence that protest tactics diffuse spatially (Soule 1997) and that this process extends to regulations on chain retailers (Ingram and Rao 2004) , protesters will be more likely to pursue size-cap regulation if it has been used nearby. Other evidence on the diffusion of regulation suggests that the success of those efforts will also be higher when similar regulations have been implemented nearby (Walker 1969; Soule and Zylan 1997) . Fear of such institutional escalation should make Wal-Mart more likely to accede to a protest by withdrawing a proposal when there are proximate examples of size-cap regulation.
Hypothesis 4.
-Proposed Wal-Mart stores are less likely to open when protested when size-cap regulations have been implemented nearby.
Liberal ideology as a signal.-Anti-Wal-Mart protests have a historical antecedent in a social movement in the first half of the 20th century that aimed to limit the growth of chain stores (Ingram and Rao 2004) . In the 1920s and 1930s, antichain contention was based on an ideology of localism (or, alternatively, anticorporatism) that saw chains and economic concentration more generally as a threat to autonomous and self-sustaining communities, and therefore to opportunity, progress, and democracy itself. The sentiment is effectively summarized by Louis Brandeis in a dissenting opinion in the case of Liggett v. Lee, where the Supreme Court ruled against a Florida antichain tax law that discriminated between chains that operated in multiple counties. Brandeis supposed that the people of Florida "may have believed that the chain store, by furthering the concentration of wealth and of power and of promoting absentee ownership, is thwarting American ideals; that it is making impossible equality of opportunity; that it is converting independent tradesmen into clerks; and that it is sapping the resources, the vigor and the hope of the smaller cities and towns" (Liggett, 288 U.S. 568-69; quoted in Schragger 2005, p. 144) . Schragger (2005) reconciles the ideological underpinnings of the earlier antichain contention and the contemporary protests against Wal-Mart. The political geography of the two episodes is strikingly different. Chains in the 1920s were characterized as "Wall Street invading Main Street," and the rural South was the epicenter of protest. Wal-Mart, however, began in the rural South and has experienced protest as it expands to more urbanized locations in the Northeast and West. Schragger observes that "those liberal, cosmopolitan opinion-making institutions of a previous era, which had viewed the anti-chain store backlash as backward and reactionary, are now leading the charge against big-box stores" (p. 176).
As the location of contention has changed, so has its content. Anti-WalMart protestors "tend not to emphasize the 'small dealers and worthy men' who were at the center of the anti-chain store movement. Instead their focus is on the poor, not the petit bourgeoisie. And while contemporary critics of consumerism and consumer culture often assert that the national preoccupation with consumerism is destructive of democracy, those critics tend to be drawing more from a Marxist critique of materialism than from a Brandesian celebration of the independent retailer" (Schragger 2005, p. 176) . The six items on the left of the chart might be categorized as liberal issues. They evidence some continuity between the anti-Wal-Mart protests and the first wave of antichain contention, as almost half of all contention is concerned with the preservation of community and the protection of local businesses. But beyond the labels of community and local business, these claims are not completely consistent with those of the earlier antichain episode because what they celebrate about communities and fear from the chains is different. It is not uncommon for anti-Wal-Mart contenders to complain about the aesthetic threat to their property values, an argument that seems pale compared to the earlier arguments of progressive decentralists regarding the importance of vibrant communities for opportunity and progress. And when the National Trust for Historic Preservation declares the whole state of Vermont to be endangered to discourage new Wal-Mart stores, it seems that some anti-Wal-Mart contenders fear the infusion of the "Red-State" culture that they associate with Wal-Mart more than the implications of corporate concentration. Indeed, a New York Times article reporting the designation of Vermont as endangered notes as evidence of Wal-Mart's controversial status that it is favored by religious music fans and Dick Cheney (Belluck 2004) .
Beyond community and local business, the contemporary episode demonstrates the progress of contention as a new set of claims have emerged around causes such as consumer and employee rights, the environment, and international trade practices. On the right of the graph are six issues that are not so clearly liberal, such as traffic, crime, tax subsidies, complaints over specific business relationships (e.g., a sour transaction with a local supplier), and retail saturation (retail saturation is a general claim that there is too much retailing, distinguished from the local business category, which contains an evaluation about which type of retailingchain or independent-is preferable). The biggest category on the righthand side of the graph, "other," represents mostly claims that local zoning laws or regulatory procedures have been violated.
Liberal ideology may increase the motivation of anti-Wal-Mart forces to push protests to success, making those protests more potent cost signals to Wal-Mart. Liberal communities may also be more likely to host local governments and other institutions that are sympathetic to the goals of anti-Wal-Mart protests. Protests in more liberal communities may also have more of a negative impact on potential revenues for a store if opened. Kleine, Kleine, and Kernan (1993) use social identity theory to predict that the frequency with which an act of consumption is performed depends on the salience of the identities the act represents. Thus, protests may interact with political ideology by making certain identities (e.g., as someone invested in the issues on the left of fig. 1 ) more salient for shoppers. This effect can be reinforced by social networks, which may create ideological norms against patronizing a store whose character as a violator of the environment, or enemy of local business, has been made salient by protest. Store profitability.-Whereas protests signal political and market costs of opening a store, these should be weighed against the potential benefits of the store to Wal-Mart. The quick withdrawal in the face of protest that we predict as part of the test for protest theory derives from the position that withdrawals are of low cost to Wal-Mart. That is generally true and has been becoming more true over time because as Wal-Mart has continued its expansion in the United States, it has by necessity placed new stores closer and closer to existing stores, increasing cannibalization, which means that the incremental profits of an additional store are lower when it is closer to existing stores (Holmes 2008) . This suggests that the cost to Wal-Mart of withdrawing a proposal is higher if the proposed store is farther away from existing stores.
Correspondingly, the indirect cost to Wal-Mart of fighting a protest is also lower when the proposed store is farther away from existing stores, because public bad will from fighting protestors in a community can be expected to transfer over short distances to hurt sales in nearby stores. This logic was illustrated in 2005 when Wal-Mart withdrew a proposal to build a superstore in Newport News, Virginia, in response to community resistance (Sprawl-Busters 2005) . Mayor Joe Frank said after meeting with Wal-Mart officials that the company "felt it was just not a project they wanted to pursue. You don't put off the community you want to do business in [Wal-Mart has open a store that was protested (because the store was particularly profitable or the protest signal was weak), we expect that it will nevertheless make a concession to the protestors, both to create local goodwill and to reduce the likelihood that disgruntled protestors will form regional or national movements. Another way of understanding such concessions is to realize that the price that protestors extract from a corporate target need not be in the currency of their protest demands (Diermeier 2003) .
A simple and legitimate way for Wal-Mart to concede to protesters is to make a donation to community causes. Such donations represent a case of prosocial behavior to restore a favorable image. Goffman (1959) suggested that individuals resort to defensive impression management techniques to restore their "face" after their identity has been spoiled.
Since then, neoinstitutional researchers have proposed that organizations use socially acceptable procedures to carry out controversial activities (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Scott 2007) . Tedeschi and Riess (1981) have shown that individuals use enhancements to improve the perceived merit or desirability of a controversial action. In short, impression management by firms helps repair legitimacy (Elsbach and Sutton 1992) . In this regard, donations may be seen as gifts to the community that signal Wal-Mart's responsiveness to the community (Fombrun and Shanley 1990) . WalMart's donations are targeted to local community causes such as the Little League and represent a tactic of cooptation and cultivating a communityfriendly image.
Hypothesis 7.-Wal-Mart's donations to the community are likely to increase after a protest against store opening.
DATA AND METHODS
Our first dependent variable is whether proposed stores were actually opened. We tested the hypotheses regarding the effectiveness of protest on store opening using a data set of all the places where Wal-Mart proposed to open new stores from 1998 to 2005. The average time from a Wal-Mart proposal to opening is about two years, so stores opened through 2007 are in our proposal data set. Our unit of analysis is place, which refers to a city, town, village, or unincorporated census area. Place is generally a smaller unit than a county, and there were 25,375 places in the United States in 2000. A new store proposal was defined as a proposal to open a discount store, a supercenter, or a neighborhood market. A relocated store (i.e., an existing store moving to a new location in the same community) was not treated as a new store. We started our observation in 1998 because one of our data sources (the Sprawl-Busters database of protests) began to collect anti-Wal-Mart protest data from 1998 onward. We ended in 2005 because we need a time interval of at least two years to determine whether a proposed store was opened.
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We compiled the data set from three different sources. First, we started with a list of all Wal-Mart store openings from 1962 to 2007. 3 We estimated the proposal time for each of the opened stores as 789 days before the opening, a figure that represents the average time between proposal and opening for stores for which both dates are available. Second, we collected protest data from Sprawl-Busters, an anti-Wal-Mart organization that has been collecting the news about anti-big-box store protests from various sources since 1998. 4 From the Sprawl-Busters database, we selected all the protests that targeted Wal-Mart's store proposals from 1998 to 2005. We also collected reports of protests from other activists' websites. A protest against a proposed Wal-Mart store can be reported multiple times, and we coded the multiple reports as one protest as long as they were targeted at the same store proposal. Third, we conducted a media search for reports about Wal-Mart's store proposals and protests from 1998 to 2005 using the Lexis-Nexis and the America's News databases. We matched the data of proposed stores and protests obtained from the three sources and dropped the duplicated cases. In total, Wal-Mart made 1,599 new store proposals in 1,207 places, 563 of which saw protests, and 1,040 ultimately resulted in store openings. Figure 2 illustrates the geographical distribution of the store proposals, protests, and protest success (i.e., the places that saw protests and where Wal-Mart failed to open stores by the end of 2007).
The multiple sources of our data with different interests in the contention, including the representations of Wal-Mart, protestors, and the media, mitigate the concern about selection bias that would loom large if we relied on only one source. Overall, 94% of proposed stores either resulted in store opening or appeared in more than one of our sources. A particular concern with our data is the reliance on Sprawl-Busters to identify protests. Given the advocacy of that organization, we worried about the possibility that it might overrepresent the incidence and success of antiWal-Mart protests by reporting phantom incidents of protests in cases in which there may not have been a real protest or even a real proposed store.
5 Thus, we were particularly concerned about the 10% of SprawlBusters reported incidents that were not confirmed in Lexis-Nexis or America's News and did not result in actual Wal-Mart store openings. We gain some confidence from the fact that Sprawl-Busters often reported these incidents with specificity, 50% of the time listing specific organizations that led local protests and 68% of the time listing specific tactics. These levels of specificity suggest to us that there were real events underlying the reports because misreporting protest incidents with such spec- ificity would raise the real possibility that Wal-Mart could disconfirm the reports and discredit Sprawl-Busters. Nevertheless, we performed a supplementary analysis in which we omitted the 10% of Sprawl-Busters reported protests that were not confirmed in other sources. The results were substantively the same as those we report below.
Dependent Variable and Estimation
Our dependent variable is the opening of a proposed Wal-Mart store. Opening is a dummy variable that is coded 1 if a proposed store was successfully opened by the end of 2007. We used a probit model to estimate the effect of protests on the openings of Wal-Mart stores. However, we confronted a nonrandom assignment problem: protests are not likely to happen randomly; communities choose whether to organize protests in the first place and consider their chances of success when they do so. An added issue is that protests also are conditional on a proposal from a WalMart, and in turn, these proposals are also not distributed randomly.
Thus, standard econometric methods that assume random treatment cannot accurately estimate causal relationships in this circumstance. There are two main approaches to estimate causal effects of nonrandomized treatment: methods based on controlling for observed differences (e.g., multivariate regression and propensity score matching) and those based on instrument variables (IV; Gozalo and Miller 2007) . The IV approach relies on the identification of variables that affect treatment and affect the outcome only through the treatment. Moreover, the validity of IV variables cannot be empirically verified (Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin 1996) . In our research context, we do not have apparent IVs, and thus we focus on the approach that controls for observed confounding variables.
We adopted the inverse probability treatment weighting (IPTW) method that was recently developed and widely adopted by biostatisticians to resolve the nonrandom assignment problem in observational data (Robins, Herman, and Brumback 2000; Azoulay, Ding, and Stuart 2007) . The IPTW relies on the logic of counterfactuals and compares each treated subject or observation to a pseudo-population, and the difference between the groups represents the average treatment effect. More specifically, each observation in the sample is assigned a stabilized weight,
where indicates potential treatment (i.e., protest or not) and a p {0, 1} i represents the observed confounding variables. Those places that prol i tested Wal-Mart's proposals receive the weight
where is the predicted probability that place i would protest if Walp i11
Mart proposed to open a store. The numerator is the sample proportion of places that actually protested. Similarly, those places that did not protest receive the weight
where is the predicted probability that place i would not protest if p i01 Wal-Mart proposed to open a store. In this way, the IPTW method simultaneously counterbalances the estimation bias caused by Wal-Mart's selection of a place to propose and the activists' choice to protest.
We adopted the Heckman two-stage selection model (Heckman 1979 ) to calculate the probability of the incidence of protests, because protests can be observed only in places where Wal-Mart proposed to open new stores and Wal-Mart is unlikely to randomly propose new stores. Instead, Wal-Mart is likely to consider the size of local market, economic conditions, transportation costs, and even potential resistance. The Heckman two-stage selection model accounts for the sample selection problem through estimating a selection effect coefficient (called the inverse Mills ratio) in a first-stage probit model and then controlling the coefficient to a second-stage model. To conduct the first-stage probit model, we collected additional data from 1998 to 2005 about all American places where WalMart could have made store proposals. We predicted the likelihood that Wal-Mart actually proposed opening a store in a place in a year by using the place's ln transformed population, median household income, distance to the nearest Wal-Mart distribution center, the percentage of union membership in the private employment sector in the state, and calendar year as explaining variables. In the second stage, we estimated a probit model of protests by controlling the sample selection coefficient, including all independent and control variables, and reporting geographically clustered robust standard errors. Thus, the Heckman probit model estimates the chance of protest conditional on a selection model of proposal. Appendix table A1 presents the result of this model of protests.
Another methodological issue is the potential interdependence between observations. Although most places in our sample experienced only one proposal during our study period, there are some places where Wal-Mart made multiple proposals. To account for the correlation in the error terms due to the clustering within the same place, we used geographically clustered robust standard errors.
Independent and Control Variables
Protest serves as an independent variable in the store opening analysis to test hypothesis 1. We operationalized protests as occurring if our sources reported that individuals or organizations did any of the following in response to a proposed Wal-Mart store: encouraged public hearings; collected citizens' signatures to initiate a referendum; demanded additional studies of Wal-Mart's impact on local businesses, traffic, and environment; highlighted environmental hazards; deployed zoning restrictions; lobbied for store size-cap legislation; or filed lawsuits against Wal-Mart or local government. In supplemental analyses, we examined whether any of these forms of protest were more effective than any other and found that they were not. This somewhat surprising result may occur because the incidence of any form of protest is sufficient to signal to Wal-Mart that a community has a capacity for collective action and might eventually employ other forms of protest. It is certainly true that in some of the longer protest episodes, protestors employed many of the protest forms on this list.
To test whether protests are more effective in certain communities, we created a list of interaction variables between protests and community characteristics. All continuous community-level variables that involve interaction effects were centered by mean to alleviate the concern of multicollinearity. To test hypothesis 2, we created a dummy variable, protest organization, that was coded 1 if a protest was led by either preexisting or newly formed organizations, such as citizens' groups, local business organizations, unions, women's organizations, student groups, schools, or churches.
To test hypothesis 3, we controlled the contagion effect of protest success in nearby communities by including the geographical distance-weighted count of prior protests that successfully defeated Wal-Mart. We also tried a variety of other variables to define protest success in nearby communities, such as successful protests within the same standard metropolitan area, within 100 miles, or within 200 miles. We also tried to weight these variables by the effect of time decay (i.e., decay by days, or we count only those protests within the past 365 days). All these variables are highly correlated and generate similar results. Thus, we report only the result of the prior success weighted by geographical distance.
To test hypothesis 4, we included a variable to measure the hazard of institutional escalation by including a dummy variable that indicates whether an enacted legislation that restrains store size exists elsewhere within the same state in the prior year. We collected the data about the municipal-level store size legislation from the Institute for Local SelfReliance.
To test hypothesis 5, we measured liberal ideology using two variables. One is a place's pro-Democrat political orientation, measured as the county-level vote margins of those supporting a Democratic presidential candidate over those supporting a Republican candidate during the nearest past presidential election. The data were collected from the countylevel presidential election results from 1996 to 2004 reported by U.S. News and World Report. The other is the percentage of people with a college education out of the total population 25 years or older in a place (Lipset 1960) . The data were collected from the 2000 Population Census.
To test hypothesis 6, we included a variable to measure the potential profitability of a proposed store, measured by the ratio of a proposal place's distance to the closest Wal-Mart store and its distance to the closest distribution center. Reflecting the hypothesis, the ratio is a good indicator of profitability because a longer distance to existent stores means a lower threat of cannibalization (Holmes 2008) . The costs of cannibalization by closely packaged stores may be offset by efficiencies of distribution, so we simultaneously consider the distance to a distribution center. Since the distribution of distance is highly skewed, we used the log transformed distance.
Besides hypothesized variables, we include a list of control variables. We controlled for population size, unemployment rate, income per capita, and the percentage of urban population in a place. We controlled the migration level in a place by including the percentage of a county's population over five years old in 2000 that had a residence in a different county five years ago. All these data were collected from the 2000 Population Census. We also created dummy variables to indicate the region of a place. Following the Census Bureau's classification, we divided the nation into four regions: Northeast, South, West, and Midwest.
We also control community homogeneity using a list of variables that capture the social demographic characteristics of a place. Race homogeneity is measured by a Herfindahl index for each place i:
where j represents either of the following six race groups, white, black, Hispanic, Asian, Native American, and other. Similarly, we also examined a place's occupation homogeneity, education homogeneity, income homogeneity, and religion homogeneity; none of these were significant or affected the hypothesized effects, so we do not include them in the estimations presented below. A set of variables about a place's retail economy were also included. We measured the percentage of civil labor force employed in the retail sector using the data from the Census of 2000. We also controlled the state-level count of stores that are affiliated with Wal-Mart's two major competitors, Target and K-Mart, lagged by one year. The data were collected from Target and K-Mart's annual reports as well as K-Mart store closing lists before and after its bankruptcy.
We controlled three other variables that are possibly related to store opening. The first was the union density measured by the percentage of workers who are union members in a state's private sector in the previous year. The union data were obtained from the Current Population Survey. We created two variables to control the characteristics of local governments. One was the government's debt per capita, measured by the total outstanding debt of a county government divided by the county's population. The data were collected from the Census of Governments in 1997 and 2002. The other was the structure of local government. We created a dummy variable, city manager, to indicate whether a local government adopted the council-manager form of government (for contrast is the mayor-council form of government). The data were collected from the Municipal Yearbook and local governments' websites. Koopmans and Olzak (2004) propose that specialized gatekeepers such as media or editors select some messages that can evoke reactions from others and argue that such resonant messages become relevant, become prominent, and speed diffusion of a social movement. So we controlled the influence of media's attention on anti-Wal-Mart protests using two variables. One was the annual count of editorials with "Wal-Mart" as a keyword, lagged by one year. 7 The other was the annual percentage of editorials that hold an unfavorable attitude about Wal-Mart. The data were collected from the America's News database. Finally, we controlled for a time trend, in case the incidence of store opening increases or decreases during the period we analyze. A complete list of all variables, measures, and data sources is provided in Appendix table A3. Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for all variables. Model 3 includes protest organization, which is significantly effective in reducing Wal-Mart store openings ( , ) . When other b p Ϫ0.843 P ! .01 variables are held at their means, a protest led by an organization can further reduce the chance of a Wal-Mart store opening by 23% when compared with those without leading organizations. The result provides strong support for hypothesis 2. Model 4 examines hypothesis 3 by including the interaction between protest and the protest success in neighboring communities. The interaction term is insignificant, but the main effect of protest success in a neighboring area and the main effect of protest are both significant and negative. Successful protests nearby decrease the likelihood that a proposed store will open, regardless of whether that store is the target of protests. Model 5 tests the interaction effect between protest and institutional hazard. Consistent with hypothesis 4, protests are more effective where the hazard of institutional escalation is high ( , ) . When other variables are held at their means, b p Ϫ0.689 P ! .01 a protest that happens in an area with a high hazard of institutional escalation (i.e., where hostile legislation exists elsewhere within the same state) can further reduce the chance of a Wal-Mart store opening by 14% when compared with those in an area without a high hazard of escalation.
RESULTS

Effectiveness of Protests
To test hypothesis 5, model 6 includes the interaction effects between protest and the two variables representing liberal ideology. There is no evidence suggesting that protests are more or less effective in places with a more college-educated population, but protests do reduce store openings in pro-Democrat places ( , ). Model 7 tests the interb p Ϫ1.221 P ! .05 action effect between protest and profitability. Consistent with hypothesis 6, protests are less successful in preventing a store opening where the potential profitability of a proposed store is high ( , ). b p 1.039 P ! .05 Finally, model 8 reports a full model with all the interactions and is consisted with the previous nested models.
The Analyses of Wal-Mart's Donations
Our second dependent variable is the amount of money that Wal-Mart donates to communities when stores are opened. Wal-Mart's donations are targeted to local community causes such as the Little League and represent a tactic of cooptation and cultivating a community-friendly image. We predicted with hypothesis 7 that protests would increase the need for cooptation and therefore the magnitude of the donations. We collected data about Wal-Mart's donations at its store openings from 2004 
Robustness Checks for Protest Effectiveness Analysis
The IPTW approach used in our article depends on the assumption that there are no unobserved confounders. Although this is an untestable assumption, Azoulay et al. (2007) report that techniques that assume selection on observables do well if there is a comprehensive list of controls, observations are drawn from similar contexts, and outcomes are measured in the same way for treatment and control groups. We believe that these criteria are satisfied in our study.
Nonetheless, we also undertook additional tests to demonstrate the robustness of our results. Our starting point was to assume that the events of proposal (A), protest (B), and store opening (C) can be modeled by three probit equations:
; * *
and and is missing otherwise; and
and is missing otherwise. If there are unobserved factors that Wal-A p 1 i Mart takes into consideration when making proposals (i.e., the chances of protest incidence and store opening), then is correlated with and h i i
. If there are unobserved factors that activists take into consideration m i when deciding whether to protest (i.e., the chance of store opening), then is correlated with . We assumed the error terms .
In such cases, a useful strategy is to estimate multivariate probit models with sample selection and explicitly account for the correlation of error terms across equations. In the well-known bivariate case estimated with the Stata command heckprob, there is one equation describing the binary outcome of interest and a second equation that characterizes whether the first outcome is observed or not. If the cross-equation error terms are Note.-Numbers in parentheses are SEs. * (one-tailed tests for hypothesis; otherwise two-tailed tests). P ! .05 ** (one-tailed tests for hypothesis; otherwise two-tailed tests). P ! .01 correlated, sample selection is "endogenous," in which case simply estimating a univariate probit model for the binary outcome of interest leads to inconsistent estimators of the parameters of interest. Models with multiple outcomes of interest and possibly more than one selection equation are obvious generalizations of the bivariate case (see Jenkins et al. 2006 ). We considered a situation with three binary outcomes-proposal to open a store, protest, and store opening-and have sample selection in the first case. We estimated this trivariate probit with maximum simulated likelihood ( Jenkins et al. 2006 ) using Matlab. We do not provide detailed results for the sake of brevity but found a broadly similar pattern of support for our hypotheses. The correlations among the error terms of the equations were informative. Thus, we found that the correlation of the error term of the proposal and protest equation was insignificant ( ,S Ep .020), thereby lending credence to our argument that b p .003 Wal-Mart did face uncertainty about protests; otherwise, it would have sought to propose places where protests were unlikely, in which case, unobservables would have been driving the correlation between error terms, and the correlation would have been significant. The correlations of the error terms for the other equations were also insignificant: proposal and opening ( , SE p .0807) and protest and opening (b p b p .0023 Ϫ.0006, SE p .2964).
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
As big-business organizations penetrate and constitute the basic social fabric, they have increasingly become the targets of social movement activists who seek to address social problems (Davis et al. 2005; King and Soule 2007) . Nowhere is this phenomenon more significant than in the contention against Wal-Mart, the world's largest company. Our findings have implications for social movement researchers and economic sociologists.
Contributions to social movements research.-Our findings extend research on social movements on two counts. First, we treat protest targets as strategic actors. Our findings are a notable contrast to full-information models of protest (Baron and Diermier 2007) , which predict that protests against private firms ought to be rare miscalculations since activists should select soft targets that accede to their demands before a protest and avoid firms that develop a reputation for toughness. From the perspective of the extensive literature on social movements, the political economists' treatment of protestors as a unitary actor is lacking. Protests are populated by heterogeneous individuals who are necessarily unsure of the proclivities of their potential protest cohorts. Mobilization is wrought with uncertainty for the protestors, so it must be likewise for the targets of protests. However, corporations look more like the strategic actors of game theory than the states that are more often the targets in social movement analysis. Wal-Mart's goals are simpler, and its organization more coherent and capable, than any state. We have argued that a theoretical understanding of the strategic interaction between activists and businesses must reflect the fundamental uncertainties both sides face. Individual protestors are typically unsure of their community's capacity to organize a protest and as to whether a protest once organized would be effective. Correspondingly, an organization, even one as capable as Wal-Mart, cannot be confident where and when it will meet protest. We expect the result of these uncertainties to be a low-cost trial and low-cost exit strategy, where the corporation tests markets with proposals and withdraws them if they receive a strong protest signal of subsequent costs. The result in the WalMart case is that protests against store proposals were quite common and usually succeeded in dissuading store openings.
Second, our study considers a challenging empirical issue: the selfselection of communities into the "treatment" or protest condition and control or "no-protest" condition. In the context of private politics, protests are not distributed randomly across communities. Instead, communities choose whether to organize protests, and in turn, this hinges on whether a private firm is seeking to enter the community in the first place. Since there is nonrandom assignment of communities into the protest and noprotest conditions, standard econometric methods that assume random treatment cannot accurately estimate causal relationships. We rely on a new class of techniques-IPTW models-to address selection. The IPTW method simultaneously counterbalances the estimation bias caused by Wal-Mart's selection of a place to propose and the activists' selection of a place to protest IPTW models using a counterfactual logic: they compare treated subjects to a pseudo-population of controls that were not treated, and the differential is the causal effect of treatment (protest) on outcome (opening a store).
Contributions to economic sociology.-Our study also enlarges the literature on organizations by focusing on the informational content of protests. Protests are signals of domain dissensus and ideological opposition and, in turn, future profitability of operations. Although Thompson (1967) highlighted the importance of domain consensus for the growth of individual firms, organizational theorists have emphasized the internal constraints to growth rather than external constraints such as the dearth of legitimacy. The large body of work in organizational ecology emphasizes the legitimacy of the organizational form as bolstering the fates of individual organizations, and recent work has tended to trace the legitimacy of the form to cognitive consensus as to the meaning of the category (Hannan, Pó los, and Carroll 2007) . Our study, by contrast, illuminates how large and visible firms such as Wal-Mart may be singled out for delegitimation, even though (or because) they may be prototypical instances of a category. By showing how local communities are the sites of protests against Wal-Mart's entry, our study highlights how there is spatial variation in normative dissensus about the category and directs attention to the geography of legitimacy. Although we studied store openings, future research can study closures of organizations such as abortion clinics in response to protest to understand the geography of illegitimacy.
Second, our study illustrates how the spatial organization of protests shapes the economic geography of business enterprises. Fligstein (2001) elaborated how market building is a political process, yet research on the economic geography of enterprise has devoted little attention to protests as signals of domain dissensus. Our study shows that protests deter entry in communities with a pro-Democrat orientation, and this finding is consistent with previous work that shows that antibusiness political ideology slowed the deregulation of interstate banking (Kroszner and Strahan 1999) . It also reinforces the argument that the external political atmosphere tips the power balance between activists and their targets (McAdam 1995) and that activists' claims gain resonance where they are consistent with local dominant cultures and values (Bernstein 1997) . Moreover, our findings showed that spatial contagion in successful protests reduces store openings in the focal community. The results also show that tough institutional regulations in nearby communities also induce WalMart to withdraw. When a community faces Wal-Mart, the contest is asymmetric as local activists are facing a large, powerful, and centralized foe that can easily threaten them by locating a store in a proximal community and still undermine Main Street businesses. In such cases, successful protests in neighboring communities not only fuel protest in a focal community but also increase its success rate by inoculating the entire region against Wal-Mart. The Wal-Mart case also shows that institutional escalation in the form of size-cap regulation was an important way that one community's contest with Wal-Mart could affect another's. WalMart's whole approach to protest is consistent with a strategy that seeks to keep protests local and to minimize the diffusion of the most potent anti-Wal-Mart regulations.
Finally, our study also indicates that even when it enters a community after a protest, Wal-Mart is affected as it makes greater donations to community causes, presumably to strengthen its identity and social standing in the community. Unlike the state, which may repress protest, business organizations also engage in "goodwill-buying" actions and developing allies in the community. Such goodwill-buying actions may also be perceived by activists as victories of a type, and future research on protests against Wal-Mart and other companies should consider not only whether activists stop a proposal but how they change it. The bottom line is that protests against Wal-Mart are affecting the retailer both directly and indirectly. Indeed, with a 64% rate of protest success in stopping store openings and increased donations to communities when stores do open, the conclusion must be that community protests are shaping the domain and behavior of the world's largest company. This form of contention has until now been mostly ignored by scholars of organizations and social movements. Yet, it may be at the crux of the coevolution of economy and society in the democratic-capitalist world. Note.-Predicted protest dummy is defined as 1 if the predicted likelihood of protest given proposal from the Heckman model is greater than .5. 
APPENDIX
